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SUCKER RUMINATION:
HOW AVERSIVE SELF-DIRECTED COGNITIONS
AFFECT PURCHASE INTENTIONS
TYLER F. STILLMAN
SOUTHERN UTAH UNIVERSITY
GREGORY S. PRUESS
NORTH CAROLINA WESLEYAN COLLEGE
ABSTRACT
If there is a silver lining to having been tricked in an economic context, perhaps it
is that one can be wiser for the experience. Presumably, people are able to learn from such
transactions and avoid them in the future. The current study employed an experimental
design in which some participants were assigned to a control condition and others were
told that they had recently been duped. Results indicated that among those who felt
duped, people high in sucker rumination were subsequently less likely to avoid the source
of deception. That is, people with a tendency to blame themselves harshly for being duped
were the least likely to be wiser for the experience. For people high in sucker rumination,
there is a great deal of psychic discomfort in getting duped, but no silver lining of being
wiser.
INTRODUCTION
Most people have had at least one negative financial experience, such as a
transaction in which they lost money. Some of these experiences are simply the result of
honest mistakes or unfortunate timing. However, other detrimental financial transactions
stem from a seller’s unscrupulous motives and actions. Central to the current
investigation is how people think about financial transactions in which they have been
scammed or duped. In particular, we used the Sucker Rumination Scale (Preuss, Stillman,
Mead, and Vohs, 2011, Preuss, Stillman, and Vohs 2014) to measure the extent to which
people experience negative and aversive self-focused thoughts after being tricked in an
economic transaction. We sought to understand how individual differences in sucker
rumination would impact the degree to which one seeks to avoid getting duped in future
transactions.
Sucker Rumination
Economic exchanges of all kinds require at least some element of trust (Arrow,
1972). According to an empirical analysis of being duped, "feeling duped involves a sense
that one's trust was violated" in an economic transaction (Vohs, Baumeister, and Chin;
2007, p. 130). The concept of sucker rumination does not speak to the degree to which
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one feels violated, but the degree of self-blame which accompanies violated trust. Our
expectation was that individual differences in self-blame and other negative self-focused
thoughts would impact behavior in future economic transactions. Our four hypotheses
about sucker rumination are specified further below.
The global concept of rumination is considered a personality characteristic,
(Trapnell, and Campbell, 1999), whereas the term sucker rumination is relevant
specifically and narrowly to financial contexts. Rumination in the global sense is
characterized by a repetitive focus on one's negative emotions (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991,
2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, and Grayson, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, and
Larson, 1994) as well as a high degree of self-reflection (Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema,
1990). In contrast, sucker rumination is defined as the tendency to experience aversive
self-focused cognitions after being duped in an economic transaction. The similarity
between the two constructs is that they both entail an unwillingness or inability to let go
of negative experiences, and the key difference is that sucker rumination is specific to
being the victim of an unscrupulous financial transaction.
In what is known as the illusion of invulnerability, people are generally reluctant
to acknowledge the possibility that they can be duped or tricked. However, one study
found some benefits from learning that one can be tricked (Sagarin, Cialdini, Rice, and
Serna, 2002). In particular, participants rated several advertisements and provided
feedback as to how persuasive those advertisements were. They were then informed that
they had been persuaded by deceptive advertisements. Subsequently, these participants
showed greater skepticism of deceptive — but not legitimate — advertisements. Overall,
participants who had been duped learned a valuable lesson and were subsequently
skeptical when appropriate. One crucial assumption of the current research is that the
process of learning from being duped is uneven and imperfect, such that some people
learn more readily from being tricked than others. We predicted that the effect of being
tricked on subsequent behavior would be moderated by (i.e., conditional upon) individual
differences in sucker rumination.
Sucker Rumination Scale
A six-item scale has been developed to assess individual differences in sucker
rumination. Sample items include "If I fall for a scam, I repeatedly tell myself that I should
have known better" and "If I get suckered, it takes a long time for me to forgive myself for
being so foolish." (See Appendix A for all items). Prior work has established that the scale
has good psychometric properties, as assessed across a variety of methods including
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses (Preuss et al., 2011, 2014). In addition, prior
work has found that people who are high in sucker rumination experienced a low degree
of general and consumer well-being (Preuss et al., 2014). In particular, people high in
sucker rumination made especially negative statements about themselves when
describing a time they felt tricked in a financial interaction. They were also found to be
less likely to experience positive emotions and more likely to experience negative
emotions. People high in sucker rumination were also found to be drawn towards material
purchases and away from experiential purchases, a tendency which is unfavorable to
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happiness and well-being (Carter and Gilovich, 2010; Howell, Pchelin, and Iyer, 2013;
Van Boven and Gilovich, 2003).
Current Investigation
The concept of sucker rumination is relatively new, and relatively little is known
about it. Prior research has established that people differ in the degree to which they
experience aversive self-focused cognitions after being duped in an economic transaction
(Preuss et al., 2011), and that people high in sucker rumination suffer poorer well-being
(Preuss et al., 2014). Our review of the literature found nothing regarding the marketplace
implications of sucker rumination. The current investigation sought to determine
whether differences in sucker rumination led people to be especially careful in avoiding
the potential of being duped in the future. We use the term avoidance intentions to
describe the behavioral changes and adjustments one might make to avoid getting duped
in the future.
Hypotheses 1a and 1b
We identified two plausible yet mutually incompatible hypotheses. The first
hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a) was as follows. People high in sucker rumination, by
definition, were expected to direct abusive and highly negative thoughts towards
themselves after being duped. This preoccupation with their own blameworthiness was
expected to undermine their ability to respond to future situations appropriately. For
example, imagine a person high in sucker rumination who has been ripped off by her local
auto repair shop. She may, according to Hypothesis 1a, blame herself so completely that
she reserves little blame for the auto repair shop. Consequently, she may continue her
patronage of the auto repair shop that ripped her off. That is, Hypothesis 1a predicts that
apportioning a high degree of blame to the self reduces the blame apportioned to the
source of deception, leaving people high in sucker rumination less likely to avoid the
source of deception. Hypothesis 1a followed this reasoning, and stated that high sucker
rumination reduces the likelihood of avoiding the source of deception. Hypothesis 1a is
supported by research in which high levels of global rumination were found to undermine
problem solving in interpersonal matters (Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). In
other words, a high degree of self-blame in interpersonal matters was found to disrupt
effective dealing with those matters.
Hypothesis 1b was the alternative to this, and stated that high sucker rumination
increases, rather than decreases, the likelihood of avoiding the source of deception.
Following the previous example, this would mean that the high sucker-rumination
woman ripped off by her local auto repair shop would be more likely than her low suckerrumination peers to avoid that shop in the future, as compared to her low suckerrumination peers. The rationale for Hypothesis 1b follows is consistent with an analysis
by Vohs, Baumeister, and Chin (2007), who speculated that rumination in the aftermath
of being duped would likely be dominated by counterfactual thoughts in which one
considered how to avoid getting duped. If this reasoning is correct, then it follows that
people who are high in sucker rumination would be especially likely to think about how
to avoid getting duped in the future.
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Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 addressed the process by which sucker rumination would was
expected to affect the avoidance of the deceptive entity. Vohs et al. (2007) speculated that
negative affect was an important part of forming avoidance intentions. In particular, they
suggested that negative affect drives the kind of counterfactual thinking that would lead
one to avoiding being duped in the future. According to this view, experiencing negative
emotions is crucial to the adaptive process that leads to one avoiding a source of deception
(cf. Ciaracco, Vohs, and Baumeister, 2010). In terms of the repair shop example
mentioned above, this would mean that the high-sucker rumination customer would
avoid the dishonest repair shop at least in part due to the negative emotions the event
provoked. Hypothesis 2 stated that people high in sucker rumination are more likely to
experience negative affect, which in turn leads to greater avoidance intentions. We use
the term indirect effect (also called mediational effect) to describe the expected role of
negative affect.
Hypothesis 3
Under what circumstances would one expect sucker rRumination to increase
avoidance intentions? We predicted that individual differences in sucker rumination
would be most pronounced when one had recently been duped. Our prediction is
consistent with research demonstrating that consumers who have been fooled by false
advertising tend to be skeptical of future advertising from other sources (Darke and
Ritchie, 2007; Sagarin et al., 2002). We expected that the effect of individual differences
in sucker rumination on avoidance intentions would vary based on whether one had
recently been duped. Hence, Hypothesis 3 stated that individual differences in sucker
rumination would lead to avoidance intentions primarily after one had experienced being
duped. We use the term conditional effect (effect (also called moderation) to describe the
prediction that the impact of sucker rumination was conditional upon having recently
been duped. It should be noted that Hypothesis 3 was consistent with both Hypothesis 1a
and Hypothesis 1b; whatever the effect of sucker rumination on avoidance intentions, the
effect should emerge more strongly in the aftermath of being duped. If sucker rumination
leads to reduced avoidance intentions, that relationship should be stronger when the
experience of being duped is fresh in the individual’s mind. If sucker rumination leads to
increased avoidance intentions, that relationship should also be stronger when an
individual has recently experienced being duped.
Hypothesis 4
The last and most important hypothesis brings together elements of the previous
hypotheses. Hypothesis 4 stated that the role of negative affect (indirect effect;
Hypothesis 2) would vary as a function of whether one had recently experienced being
duped (conditional effect; Hypothesis 3). This would mean that the extent to which sucker
rumination led to negative affect, which in turn led avoidance intentions, would be
stronger following being duped. We use the term conditional indirect effect to describe
this (also called moderated mediation). Hypothesis 4 stated that the normal process of
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high sucker rumination leading to negative affect, which in turn leads to avoidance
intentions, will be strengthened in the aftermath of being duped.
Overview
We tested our hypotheses in an online experiment. There were three main steps to
our procedure. First, we assessed participants’ individual differences in sucker
rumination. Second, we administered the experimental manipulation whereby some
participants were led to believe they had been tricked. Whereas most research on
deceptive marketplace actions relies on misleading advertisements (e.g., Darke and
Ritchie, 2007; Obermiller, and Spangenberg, 1998, 2000; Sagarin et al., 2002), we used
misleading customer reviews. Our reasoning was that customers rely heavily on customer
reviews when making purchases online (Malbon, 2013), and online purchasing continues
to grow (“Shopping and the Internet,” 2012). Thus, we expected our findings would be
relevant and ecologically valid. The third step was to measure negative affect and our
dependent variable, which was participants’ desire to avoid customer reviews in the
future.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 200 people recruited for inclusion in an online study. We sought
to have a broadly representative sample in terms of age and demographics to maximize
generalizability. The demographic composition of the sample was as follows: 65% White,
24% Black, 6% Asian, and the remainder was of other races, multiple races, or did not
report race. Mean age was 36.62 (SD = 13.71). Fifty-two percent of the respondents were
female.
All participants were recruited via Mechanical Turk. We used the title “Hotel
Preferences and Survey Questions” within Mechanical Turk and indicated that potential
participants could expect to spend up to 10 minutes on the survey. We selected settings
to recruit participants from across the US but not abroad. Participants were paid $2.00.
Procedure
Sucker Rumination
Participants completed the previously described Sucker Rumination Scale (SRS;
Preuss et al., 2011). To disguise the purpose of the survey, we embedded the SRS within
the 31-item Consumer Self-Confidence Scale (Bearden, Hardesty, and Rose, 2001). A
sample item is "I know where to find the information I need prior to making a purchase."
Participants rated their agreement with each item from 1 (not at all characteristic of me)
to 5 (extremely characteristic of me). The Consumer Self-Confidence Scale was not of
interest and was only used to reduce the likelihood that participants could anticipate our
study aims.
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Sucker Experience
To induce the feeling of being tricked, we first asked participants to evaluate a
series of seven groups of hotels, with three similar hotels in each evaluation group. For
each hotel, participants viewed an image of the hotel as well as a customer review. For
each of the seven groups, participants were asked to pick their preferred hotel. After the
last group of hotels was evaluated, we administered the experimental manipulation. By
random assignment, some participants were given a "Hotel Choice Evaluation" in which
they were told that "three of the hotels you selected included a phony review." The control
group simply moved on to the next set of questions (described below) and was told
nothing about their hotel choices.
To ensure that we successfully caused feelings of being tricked in the experimental
group, participants were asked (later in the experiment) to indicate their agreement with
the statement "I have been tricked by customer reviews" from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). Results indicated that those in the sucker-experience condition evinced
higher feelings of being tricked (M = 3.90, SD = 1.72) as compared to the control group
(M = 2.84, SD = 1.70; F(1,199) = 19.14, p < .001. Cohen’s d was .62, which is above the
threshold for a medium size effect (.50) but below a large effect (.80; Cohen, 1988).
Hence, the experimental manipulation was successful.
The low mean in the control group (2.84) suggests that people are generally
reluctant to state that they have been duped. Most people perceive themselves as not
having been tricked by customer reviews (or are reluctant to state that they have). The
mean in the control condition (3.90) was significantly higher than the control condition
but still below the midpoint of the scale, indicating that participants retained some
reluctance to state that they had been tricked. The most accurate way to describe the effect
of the manipulation was that it reduced participant’s disinclination to state that they had
been duped.
Negative Affect
To understand the role of negative affect, participants completed the Positive and
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS assesses
current affective state by asking participants about 10 components of positive affect (e.g.,
enthusiasm) and 10 components of negative affect (e.g., guilt). Participants indicated
their current level of each from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely).
Avoidance Intentions
We quantified the degree to which customers sought to avoid customer reviews in
future purchases with three items: "I plan on avoiding customer reviews in most future
product decisions," "Customer reviews are not to be trusted," and the reverse-scored item
"I plan on relying on customer reviews in most future product decisions." Agreement was
scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Items were summed to create an
index of avoidance intentions (α = .69).

Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, General Research, Volume 15, 2014

50
RESULTS
Main Effect—SRS
We regressed avoidance intentions on SRS. Results demonstrated SRS did not
directly impact avoidance intentions, β = -.08, t = 1.08, p = .28. This did not support
either Hypothesis 1a or Hypothesis 1b. Although the belief that there cannot be an indirect
effect without a main effect seems to be widespread, this belief is mistaken (Hayes, 2009;
Hayes, 2012; MacKinnon, 2008; Zhao, Lynch, and Chen, 2010). Next, we tested for an
indirect effect.
Indirect Effect — SRS and Negative Affect
We sought to understand whether high SRS scores would lead to greater negative
affect, which in turn would lead to greater avoidance intentions. First, we observed that
higher SRS scores were related to higher negative affect, β = .17, t = 2.41, p = .02. Next,
we observed that negative affect had a robust effect on avoidance intentions, such that
people high in negative affect were significantly more likely to evince avoidance
intentions, β = .53, t = 8.71, p < .001. In short, high SRS led to negative affect, and negative
affect led to greater avoidance intentions. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2.
Next, we conducted a formal test of the indirect and direct effects together in a
standard test of statistical mediation (see Figure 1). We used the PROCESS bootstrapping
procedure (Hayes, 2013). Results indicated the presence of mediation: a 95% confidence
interval for the size of the indirect effect ranged from .003 to .13. Because the upper and
lower estimates for the size of the indirect effect did not include zero, this indicates the
presence of mediation. This confidence interval was calculated with 5,000 bias-corrected
bootstrap sample.
The mediation analysis indicated that sucker rumination led to an increase in
negative affect, which led to an increase in avoidance intentions. Results also revealed
that with the indirect effect taken into account, the direct effect of SRS on avoidance
intentions became significant (b = -.12, se = .04, t = 2.92, p = .005). The direct effect, in
opposition to the indirect effect, was such that higher levels of SRS led to lower avoidance
intentions.
In sum, data indicated that the effect of SRS on avoidance intentions was twofold.
There was an indirect effect, such that people high in SRS were prone to negative affect,
and negative affect prompted increased avoidance intentions. With the indirect effect
partialed out, the direct effect became significant, such that higher SRS scores led to
decreased avoidance intentions. These conflicting effects explain the absence of a
significant direct effect. Another way to understand the role of negative affect is that when
negative affect is statistically controlled, the effect of sucker rumination on avoidance
intentions is strong and clearly negative.
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Conditional Effect — SRS and Experimental Manipulation
It is only sensible for a person to avoid customer reviews if customer reviews are
believed to be suspect. Hence, we expected that a clearer picture of how sucker rumination
impacts avoidance intentions would emerge by examining the effect of SRS on avoidance
intentions within the context of the experimental manipulation--namely whether one had
recently felt duped or not.
We conducted a hierarchical linear regression in which we used mean-centered
terms for SRS scores, experimental condition, and their interaction. In the first step, we
centered SRS and experimental condition. The simple effect for SRS scores was not
significant (β = -.07, p = .31), however the simple effect for experimental condition was
significant (β = .22, p = .002) such that those who experienced being tricked by consumer
reviews were subsequently higher in avoidance intentions. In the second step, we entered
the centered interaction term and observed a significant conditional effect, β = .16, p =
.02.
To interpret this conditional effect, we tested the effect of SRS scores among
participants in the control condition, and observed a nonsignificant effect (β = .09, p =
.35). Among participants who had been tricked, we found that lower SRS scores led to
increased avoidance intentions, β = -.25, p = .02. We found support for Hypothesis 3, as
the effect of sucker rumination was found in the context of feeling duped. Hypothesis 1a
was supported, as high sucker rumination was associated with low avoidance intentions.
Hypothesis 1b was not supported. See Figure 2.
Conditional Direct and Conditional Indirect Effects —
SRS, Negative Affect, and Experimental Manipulation
In the final set of analyses, we tested the conditional and indirect effects together.
In the first analysis, we tested for a conditional indirect effect (i.e., moderated mediation)
— which is to say we tested whether the strength of the indirect effect (through negative
affect) varied as a function of the experimental condition. There were two ways the
indirect effect could be conditional. The first is through the A-path, such that the effect of
SRS on negative affect could vary as a function of experimental condition (Figure 3). This
would mean that high levels of SRS would lead to especially high (or low) levels of negative
affect when people felt tricked. To find out, we used PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) with 5,000
bias-corrected bootstrapped samples. Results indicated a nonsignificant conditional
indirect effect (coefficient, = .019, se = .19, t = .10, p = .92), such that the relationship
between higher SRS scores and higher negative affect did not fluctuate as a function of
feeling duped or not. Said plainly, high sucker rumination naturally leads to negative
affect. Results again indicated a significant conditional direct effect, this time within the
conditional indirect effect model (coefficient = .22, se = .08, t = 2.79; p = .006). This
indicates that the tendency of people high in sucker rumination to demonstrate low
avoidance intentions—in the aftermath of being duped—is not reduced when negative
affect is taken into account.
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The second possible indirect effect is thorough the B-path, such that the effect of
negative affect on avoidance intentions would depend on experimental condition (Figure
4). This would mean that high negative affect would lead to an especially low (or high)
avoidance intentions when people feel tricked. Results were similar to the prior test of
conditional indirect effect, and indicated a nonsignificant conditional indirect effect (b =
.09, se = .06, t = 1.54, p = .12). The conditional direct effect was again supported, b = .21,
se = .08, t = 2.49, p = .014.
In sum, the indirect effect was not conditional, contrary to Hypothesis 4. Said
another way, people high in SRS naturally experienced higher negative affect, regardless
of whether they currently felt duped. Likewise, people high in negative affect naturally
expressed a high degree of avoidance intentions — again regardless of experimental
condition. However, with these indirect effects taken into account the direct effect
remained conditional, such that low levels of sucker rumination led to greater avoidance
intentions, but only in the aftermath of being duped. In short, there were no conditional
indirect effects, only an indirect effect and a conditional direct effect. This is illustrated in
Figure 5.
DISCUSSION
Of the five steps in the consumer decision-making process, the least attention
seems to be paid to post-purchase behavior. When post-purchase behavior is investigated,
the research focuses overwhelmingly on the topic of customer satisfaction and customer
loyalty (Agrawal, Gaur, and Narayanan, 2012; Curtis, Abratt, Rhoads, and Dion, 2011).
We certainly do not wish to dispute the importance of these concepts. However, when
someone has been suckered in a transaction, these concepts are of reduced utility — as
presumably no one who has been duped is satisfied. The current investigation sought to
advance the understanding of a relatively new post-purchase variable — namely sucker
rumination — that makes sense in the context of fraudulent exchanges.
The limited research on sucker rumination yields three main findings. First, people
differ in the tendency towards sucker rumination (Preuss et al., 2011); second, the sucker
rumination scale is a reliable and valid measure (Preuss et al., 2011; 2014); and third,
people high in sucker rumination experience poorer well-being than people low in sucker
rumination (Preuss et al., 2014). The current work extended these findings by
demonstrating that individual differences in sucker rumination were predictive of
consumer intentions.
The Persuasion Knowledge Model (Campbell and Kirmani, 2007; Friestad and
Wright, 1994) argues that one means by which people come to understand persuasion
tactics is via personal experience. The current research was consistent with this view, as
people who had been duped reacted in a way that would decrease the likelihood of being
duped in a similar way again. We also identified variables that facilitated and disrupted
the avoidance of being duped.
The key variable of interest in the current investigation was sucker rumination, or
the degree to which one has negative self-directed cognitions in the aftermath of being
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duped. Data indicated that high levels of sucker rumination were inimical to the
avoidance of being duped in the future, and low levels of sucker rumination facilitated
avoidant responding. This fits the pattern observed for global rumination, in that high
levels of rumination have been found to lead to poor problem solving (Lyubomirsky and
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). However, being low in sucker rumination did not lead to
undifferentiated avoidance—the effect was only observed among participants who had
recently been duped. In brief, among participants who had recently been duped, those
with the most negative and most aversive cognitions were the least likely to demonstrate
an inclination to avoid the source of their being duped (e.g., customer reviews). This
suggests an unfortunate implication: the people for whom being duped is especially
painful and disruptive seem to be the least able to learn how to avoid being duped. That
is, people high in sucker rumination experience the greatest negative emotional reaction
to it. Yet this strong reaction does not translate into avoiding the source of deception.
Hence, people high in sucker rumination are vulnerable to being duped repeatedly.
The data on negative affect were seemingly contradictory. On the one hand, we
found that high levels of sucker rumination were related to high levels of negative affect.
Negative affect, in turn, was related to increased avoidance intentions. This would seem
to suggest that high levels of sucker rumination were associated with high stronger
avoidance intentions. On the other hand, we found that high levels of sucker rumination
were associated with low avoidance intentions—in the aftermath of being duped. In
reality, it seems that there is an element of negative affect that is inextricably entwined
with those high in sucker rumination, and this naturally increases people’s avoidance
intentions. Hence, when negative affect is taken into account (controlled for statistically),
a clear negative relationship emerges between sucker rumination and avoidance
intentions.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The sample studied in the current research was drawn from a North American
sample. Results might be different if participants had been from a different culture. For
instance, research has shown that cross-cultural differences exist for materialism (Ger,
and Belk, 1996), and materialism has implications for consumer behavior across a broad
spectrum of variables (e.g., Furnham and Valgeirsson, 2007; Stillman, Fincham, Vohs,
Lambert, and Phillips, 2012). One should avoid generalizing the results to cultures outside
North America.
We think the current research could have practical implications. Said plainly,
beating oneself up over being duped in an economic transaction is worse than useless —
it is counterproductive. Future research should consider whether intervention strategies
might help those prone to sucker rumination reduce the likelihood that they will find
themselves duped repeatedly.
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APPENDIX A
Instructions: For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the
statement is characteristic of you. Please use the following scale.
1=
2=
3=
4=
5=

extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like you)
somewhat uncharacteristic
uncertain
somewhat characteristic
extremely characteristic of you (very much like you)

1.

After getting duped, I tend to replay my actions and
decisions that led up to it for a long time afterwards.

2.

If I fall for a scam, I repeatedly tell myself that I should have
known better.

3.

If I get suckered, it takes a long time for me to forgive myself
for being so foolish.

4.
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Long after getting duped, my thoughts keep going back to
how I could have prevented it.
5.

If I get taken for a sucker, I dwell on it for a long time
afterwards.

6.

If I get suckered, I spend a lot of time thinking about how I
can prevent myself from getting fooled again in the future.

Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, General Research, Volume 15, 2014

58
APPENDIX B
FIGURE 1:
THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS THROUGH NEGATIVE AFFECT

Notes:
*
p < 0.05
**
p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
Estimates of indirect effects ranged from .003 to .13, which indicates significance at the
.05 level.
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FIGURE 2:
THE CONDITIONAL EFFECT AS A FUNCTION OF FEELING DUPED

Notes:
*
p < 0.05
**
p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
The interaction was significant, p = .02. Among participants who had been duped, higher
SRS scores led to weaker avoidance intentions, p = .02.
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FIGURE 3:
THE CONDITIONAL INDIRECT EFFECT ON A-PATH AND THE
CONDITIONAL DIRECT EFFECT

Notes:
*
p < 0.05
**
p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
The conditional indirect effect was not significant. The conditional direct effect was
significant, p = .006
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FIGURE 4:
THE CONDITIONAL INDIRECT EFFECT ON B-PATH AND THE
CONDITIONAL DIRECT EFFECT

Notes:
*
p < 0.05
**
p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
The conditional indirect effect was not significant. The conditional direct effect was
significant, p = .01.
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FIGURE 5: THE INDIRECT EFFECT AND CONDITIONAL DIRECT EFFECT

Notes:
*
p < 0.05
**
p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
Indirect effects effect size estimates ranged from .003 to .13, indicating significance at the
.05 level. The conditional direct effect was significant, p = .006. SRS directly reduced
avoidance intentions after being duped, p = .02.
TABLE 1
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
Feeling Duped
Negative Avoidance
SRS
(Experimental Condition)
Affect
Intentions
Mean
19.79
0.49
15.27
9.19
Standard Deviation
5.50
0.50
7.27
3.90
SRS
Feeling Duped
Negative Affect
Notes:
t
p < 0.06
*
p < 0.05
**
p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001

0.03

0.17
0.14t
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‐0.08
0.22*
0.53***

